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SECURITIES-INSIDER TRADING-THE EFFECTS OF THE
NEW EEC DRAFT INSIDER TRADING DIRECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
If asked to classify the practice of insider trading in securities as
either moral or immoral, the majority of the American public would
not hesitate to classify this practice as immoral. The United States
government's long-standing prohibition and punishment of insider
trading reflects but one manifestation of this view.' This view of
insider trading is not, however, held worldwide. Within Europe, and
particularly within the European Economic Community (EEC), there
exist some states which consider insider trading immora 2 and others
which consider insider trading perfectly acceptable.' This disparity,
when combined with the varying levels of regulation within the EEC,
poses a problematic situation. It fosters varying degrees of investor
protection among member-States, which hinders interpenetration4 of
national markets, and in turn inhibits freedom of movement of capital
among member-States, thus precluding the formation of a true com-
mon capital market.5
Recognizing the problems caused by the varying approaches to
insider trading employed by member-States, the European Commis-
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982); Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2 For example, France and the United Kingdom both prohibit insider trading.
See, e.g., Wallace, Who Is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading: A
Comparative Study of American, British and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 217,
225-40 (1985).
1 Greece, Italy, and Portugal, for example, consider insider trading to be ac-
ceptable. See, e.g., B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
251-53, 263 (1979).
1 Interpenetration is the penetration by investors of national stock exchange
markets in states other than their own for the purpose of trading. See Press Release
from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987).
s Id. A true common capital market exists where there is only one capital market
servicing the EEC, or more realistically, several capital markets, which because of
their uniformity and freedom from barriers function as one capital market. See
II.A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION at Dir. 6-8 (1982) [hereinafter
INT'L ORG.].
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sion adopted and submitted to the European Council a draft directive
prohibiting insider trading. 6 The drafters of the directive intended it
to harmonize the laws of the member-States with regard to insider
trading and to provide a minimum level of investor protection
throughout the Community. 7 The proposed directive takes a signif-
icant step toward the realization of a true common capital market,
but because it does not attempt to harmonize the penalties for violating
insider trading rules,8 the directive falls short of what is ultimately
needed in this area.
A. Definition of Insider Trading
Despite the apparent lack of controversy surrounding the definition
of insider trading, its definition provides stepping stones to other
points of controversy. 9 One commentator defines insider trading as
"the deliberate exploitation of unpublished price-sensitive informa-
tion, obtained through a privileged relationship, to make a profit or
avoid a loss by dealing in securities the price of which would be
materially altered by public disclosure of that information.' ' 10 The
Draft Directive itself contains another similar, but more relevant,
definition of insider trading. Article 1 of the directive defines insider
trading as when "any person who, in the exercise of his profession
or duties, acquires inside information . . . [and takes] advantage of
that information to buy or sell . . . transferable securities." ' " In the
process of defining insider trading, both of these definitions raise
other definitional problems such as the breadth of the term "insider"
and the scope of the term "inside information" (also "price-sensitive
information"). Member-States resolve these questions in various ways,
and because of this lack of unity, the Draft Directive purports to
harmonize the answers to these questions. 2
6 Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading,
30 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 153) 8 (1987) [hereinafter Draft Directive].
I Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987).
1 The Draft Directive imposes no minimum penalties, nor does it recommend
any effective penalties. Draft Directive, supra note 6.
9 See infra notes 102-37 and accompanying text.
10 1 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES § 12.17 (44th ed. 1986) [hereinafter GORE-
BROWNE].
Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1.
12 See Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987). How the Draft Directive
harmonizes these points of dispute will be examined later, but for now it is sufficient
to have a definitional framework via the previous definitions for examining insider
trading in the EEC and the Draft Directive.
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B. Insider Trading Law of EEC Members
As previously noted, national regulation of insider trading by EEC
members 3 varies from member to member. Currently, three members
prohibit insider trading through legislation,' 4 three members plan to
propose such legislation, 5 and one member regulates insider trading
through a set of voluntary rules.' 6 Other members, however, have
neither enacted nor proposed any legislation or rules regulating insider
trading. 7 Clearly, if the EEC adopts the Draft Directive prohibiting
insider trading, this latter category of members must enact legislation
which at least equals the Draft Directive's standard of prohibition. 8
Less clear, however, is how adoption of the Draft Directive would
affect those members already regulating, or planning to regulate,
insider trading. This lack of clarity arises from the existence of varying
techniques and standards in the regulation of insider trading among
member-States. Any examination of the Draft Directive and its im-
plementation by member-States must focus, therefore, on how it
affects those member-States which currently regulate, or plan to
regulate insider trading. This note undertakes such an examination
by focusing on the Draft Directive and its effect on two divergent
systems of regulation within the Community: the United Kingdom,
which employs an extensive statutory system, 19 and West Germany,
which operates under a voluntary system. 20
11 Currently, 12 member-States constitute the EEC: Belgium, France, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Common Market in Profile, 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1 101.07 (June 18, 1987).
1 These members are the United Kingdom, France, and Denmark.
Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
16 West Germany.
17 Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987).
IS The Draft Directive imposes only a minimum standard for prohibiting insider
trading. Member-States may enact more stringent legislation than the prohibition in
the Draft Directive if they choose, but they cannot enact legislation less stringent.
Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4.
I9 The United Kingdom, along with France, have the most developed statutory
system for the regulation of insider trading within the EEC. See, Note, Insider
Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of the Member
States, 8 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 151 (1985).
10 West Germany, while it has chosen to regulate insider trading, has done so
via a voluntary regulatory system. This method of regulation represents the least
amount of regulating among those member-States choosing to regulate insider trading.
B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 3, at 243-47.
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1. United Kingdom
Insider trading is not unfamiliar in the United Kingdom, 2' but
Parliament only in 1980 introduced statutory regulation as a means
of dealing with this problem. 2 Until the advent of statutory regulation,
the United Kingdom employed other methods for controlling insider
trading. These methods, historically proven inadequate, fall into three
general categories: common law,23 self regulation, 24 and disclosure.2 5
The common law position on insider trading is rooted in the 1902
case of Percival v. Wright.2 6 In Percival, shareholders offered to sell
their stock to the corporation's directors. Consummation of the sale,
however, occurred as the directors negotiated a sale of the corporation
to a third party. The directors did not disclose this information,
which would have substantially increased the price of the shareholders'
stock, prior to their sale with the shareholders. The former share-
holders, learning of the negotiations subsequent to the sale of their
shares to the directors, brought an action in equity against the di-
rectors. The shareholders claimed the directors were in a fiduciary
relationship with shareholders of the corporation and therefore under
a duty to disclose the price-sensitive information. The Chancery Court
held that while corporate directors have a fiduciary relationship with
the corporate entity, they do not have such a relationship with in-
dividual shareholders; shareholders, therefore, have no individual
claim against corporate directors for insider trading. 27
While Percival closed the door to shareholders, it did recognize a
fiduciary relationship between the directors and the corporation. 28
21 For a complete discussion of insider trading in the United Kingdom, see B.
RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 3, at 146-231; GoRE-BROWNE, supra note 10, at
§ 12.17-.32; D. KEENAN, SMITH AND KEENAN'S COMPANY LAW 395-98 (6th ed. 1986);
Wallace, supra note 2, at 233-40; R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 431-34 (5th ed.
1985); Note, supra note 19, at 169-70.
22 See Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73. The codification of the current
statutory regulations occurred in 1985. See Company Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act, 1985, ch. 8.
21 For a discussion of the common law method see B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH,
supra note 3 at 146-60; Wallace, supra note 2, at 233-34; GORE-BROWNE, supra note
10, at § 12.21.
24 For a discussion of the self-regulation method see B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH,
supra note 3, at 160-74; Wallace, supra note 2, at 234-36.
25 For a discussion of the disclosure method see B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra
note 3, at 174-84; Wallace, supra note 2, at 234-35.
26 2 Ch. 421 (1902).
27 Id. at 425-26.
26 Id. at 425.
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This left the door open for the corporation to sue the directors, but
few corporations have done so because of a general reluctance to
sue one's own directors. 29 Individuals looking for protection them-
selves from insider trading advanced alternative theories for holding
insiders liable to individual shareholders, including the law of con-
fidence,30 the duty to disclose,3' and unjust enrichment.3 2 The courts'
narrow application of these theories to the area of insider trading,
however, fails to provide an adequate remedy for the harm suffered
by individual shareolders.
The second method by which the United Kingdom addresses the
problem of insider trading is through the self-regulation of the private
sector. The practice of self-regulation arose primarily from the fear
that the government would begin regulating insider trading if the
professional world continued to do nothing to abate. the practice.3"
Two professional institutions, the City Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers34 and the Council for the Securities Industry,35 represent the
29 Wallace, supra note 2, at 234. More often than not the insider is the controller
of the corporation or a director, and his colleagues are reluctant to sue. B. RIDER
& H. FFRENCH, supra note 3, at 155.
30 This doctrine covers the employer-employee relationship by requiring the em-
ployee not to misuse confidential information entrusted to him in a manner imparting
an obligation to keep the information confidential. Application of this doctrine
"generally involve[s] trade secrets and intellectual property," but courts have applied
it to "revised earnings forecasts and plans for changes in corporate capital structure."
B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 3, at 158 (citing Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers)
Ltd., (1969) R.P.C. 41; Dunford & Elliot Ltd. v. Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd.,
(1977) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505).
1, Traditionally, in the absense of any misrepresentation the failure to disclose
material information in a contractual situation does not give rise to any liability.
Courts have found that some contracts, for example insurance contracts, carry a
duty not to conceal information, and some scholars argue that the same duty should
be applied to securities contracts. There exists, however, scant support for this
proposition. Id. (citing Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3 Burr. 1905).
32 Application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment requires an enrichment of
the defendant's position, a corresponding detriment to the plaintiff, and a resulting
unjustness if the parties are not restored to their prior positions. While all three
requirements are met in an insider trading case, courts have been reluctant to
invalidate the transaction absent any legal wrong, e.g., "misrepresentation, fraud,
duress or mistake". Id. at 160 (citing Coleman v. Myers, (Supreme Court of New
Zealand, 13 May 1976)).
33 Id.
1, The City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers was established in the mid 1960's
and consists of 9 representatives from the various City institutions. It uses "public
and private censure" as sanctions against insiders. B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra
note 3, at 160-61.
35 The Council for the Securities Industry was established in 1978 and consists
of representatives from various professions and institutions. Wallace, supra note 2,
at 235.
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bulk of the attempts at self-regulation.3 6 The Panel attempts to reg-
ulate insider trading through a code prohibiting insider trading, ad-
herence to which is optional unless a corporation wishes to obtain
a listing on the Stock Exchange.17 In contrast, the Council's objective
is to study and propose recommendations. The Council isolates areas
in need of improvement and then generates recommendations for
implementing that improvement." Both of these bodies continue their
attempts to regulate insider trading despite the advent of statutory
regulations. In fact, statutory regulation has recognized and even
enhanced the efforts of these institutions.3 9 The United Kingdom did
not implement statutory regulation because self-regulation failed at
regulating insider trading, but rather it implemented a statutory scheme
in part to reinforce self-regulation. The government believed that
stiffer enforcement and harsher penalties were necessary to back up
self-regulation. °
The final method used prior to statutory regulation in the United
Kingdom is disclosure. Much like self-regulation, this method remains
an integral part of regulating insider trading.4 Disclosure was enacted
statutorily42 and has two significant aspects. First, it requires share-
holders with substantial shareholdings to register, 43 and second, it
requires directors to disclose their share dealings." The rationale
36 Id. at 235-36. Other self-regulatory measures include Stock Exchange disclosure
requirements and corporate in-house rules and procedures. B. RMER & H. FFENCH,
supra note 3, at 166-74.
37 Wallace, supra note 2, at 236. The Stock Exchange is the Stock Exchange for
the United Kingdom and Ireland formed in 1973. R. PENNINGTON, supra note 21,
at 252 n.l.
31 See Wallace, supra note 2, at 235.
39 See id. at 236.
- Id.
41 B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 3, at 174.
42 In 1967, Parliament enacted disclosure requirements for corporate directors
who held shares in the corporation. Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, §§ 25, 27-31.
For the current disclosure requirements, see Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 198-
220, 323-29.
41 Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 198-202. This disclosure requirement arises
only in the wake of certain stipulated events, or when a shareholder acquires 5%
or more of the total nominal value of a class of shares with unrestricted voting
rights. Id. at §§ 198-201.
Section 324 of the Act provides that:
(1) A person who becomes a director of a company and at the time when
he does so is interested in shares in, or debentures of, the company or any
other body corporate, being the company's subsidiary or holding company
or a subsidiary of the company's holding company, is under obligation to
[Vol. 18:119
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underlying these regulations is that public exposure of those indivi-
duals trading on inside information will deter the practice of insider
trading. 45 This mechanism, as with the previous two, also proved
inadequate in the absence of statutory regulation.
The United Kingdom thus implemented statutory regulation of
insider trading to provide stiffer penalties and to reinforce those anti-
insider-trading mechanisms already in place. 46 Parliament first enacted
an insider trading prohibition in the Companies Act 198047 and then
reenacted it in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.4
The 1985 Act, as well as the 1980 Act, make the practice of insider
trading a criminal offense, with no provision for civil liability.
49
Furthermore, the 1985 Act only applies to transactions carried out
on a recognized stock exchange;50 consequently, private transactions
like the one in Percival remain unaffected. 51
The embodiment of the 1985 Act's general prohibition of insider
trading rests in Section l(1).52 This provision prohibits only primary
notify the company in writing -
(a) of the subsistence of his interests at that time; and
(b) of the number of shares of each class of, and the amount of debentures
of each class of, the company or other such body corporate in which each
interest of his subsists at that time.
Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 324(1); see also id. at §§ 323-29. For the original
enactment, see Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, §§ 25, 27-31.
41 Wallace, supra note 2, at 234.
- See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
4 Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73.
48 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8.
49 Id. at § 8; Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 72; GORE-BROWNE, supra note 10,
at § 12.22, 32.
10 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, § 1 (limited to trans-
actions on a "recognized stock exchange"); see also GoRE-BROWNE, supra note 10,
at § 12.22.
1' See GORE-BROWNE, supra note 10, at § 12.22.
32 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, § 1(1). The Act provides:
(1) Subject to section 3, an individual who is or at any time in the preceding
6 months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal
on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he has
information which-
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company,
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected, and in the
position by virtue of which he is so connected, not to disclose except for
the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position, and
(c) he knows is unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to
those securities.
Id. Section 3 of the 1985 Act lists possible defenses to the general prohibition on
insider trading. See infra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text.
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insider trading, where the individual obtaining the inside information
and the individual trading on that information are the same. The
1985 Act also prohibits secondary insider trading5 where an indi-
vidual trades on inside information received from another individual.
A third type of insider trading prohibited by the 1985 Act involves
an individual connected with one corporation trading in the securities
of another corporation. The prohibited trade is based on information
relating to an actual or contemplated transaction between the two
corporations.5 4 This final insider trading closely resembles primary
insider trading but differs in that two corporations are involved and
the insider trades in the other corporation's stock.
Because violations of the 1985 Act are criminal offenses, the statute
contains a mens rea requirement.5 Conviction under the 1985 Act
requires the supposed insider to have had a profit motive when he
traded on the inside information.5 6 In addition, the statute imposes
another subjective requirement: the supposed insider (either primary
or secondary) must be cognizant that the primary individual is con-
nected with one of the companies involved, and that he (the supposed
insider) possesses inside information.57
The 1985 Act defines inside information in Section 10, which states
that there are two characteristics of "unpublished price-sensitive in-
formation. 5 S8 First, the information must relate to a specific matter
of the corporation rather than relating to the corporation in a general
nature. 9 Second, the information must not be generally known by
those persons who regularly or could potentially deal in that cor-
5 Id. at §§ 1(3) and (4). Secondary insider trading is also known as "tippee"
insider trading.
54 Id. at § 1(2). Public servants who obtain information in their official capacity
are also defined as insiders. Id. at § 2.
51 This can be inferred from § 3 providing the defense of lack of a profit motive.
Id. at § 3. See also Wallace, supra note 2, at 236-37.
56 See Wallace, supra note 2, at 236-37.
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, §§ 1(1) and (3).
18 Id. at § 10. Section 10 provides in full:
Any reference in this Act to unpublished price-sensitive information in relation
to any securities of a company is a reference to information which -
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or indirectly)
to that company, that is to say, is not of a general nature relating or of
concern to that company, and
(b) is not generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would
be likely to deal in those securities but which would if it were generally
known to them be likely materially to affect the price of those securities.
19 Id. at § 10(a).
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poration's securities, and if known, it must be of such nature that
it would "materially" affect the securities' price. 6°
The 1985 Act also provides for several defenses to the charge of
insider trading. 61 These defenses include lack of a profit motive, an
exercise of good faith by a liquidator, receiver (or trustee) in bank-
ruptcy, and the obtainment and good faith use of information by a
jobber. 62 An individual convicted of insider trading under the 1985
Act faces imprisonment of up to two years, a fine, or both. 63
2. West Germany
The regulation of insider trading in West Germany is most ap-
propriately labelled "voluntary self-regulation."' Unlike the United
6 Id. at § 10(b).
61 Id. at § 3. Section 3 provides in full that:
(1) Sections 1 and 2 do not prohibit an individual by reason of his having any
information from -
(a) doing any particular thing otherwise than with a view to the making
of a profit or the avoidance of a loss (whether for himself or another
person) by the use of that information;
(b) entering into a transaction in the course of the exercise in good faith
of his functions as liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy; or
(c) doing any particular thing if the information -
(i) was obtained by him in the course of a business of a jobber in which
he was engaged or employed, and
(ii) was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him to
obtain in the ordinary course of that business, and he does that thing
in good faith in the course of that business.
"Jobber" means an individual, partnership or company dealing in se-
curities on a recognised stock exchange and recognised by the Council
of the Stock Exchange as carrying on the business of a jobber.
(2) An individual is not, by reason only of his having information relating to any
particular transaction, prohibited -
(a) by section 1(2), (4)(b), (5) or (6) from dealing on a recognised stock
exchange in any securities, or
(b) by section 1(7) or (8) from doing any other thing in relation to securities
which he is prohibited from dealing in by any of the provisions mentioned
in paragraph (a), or
(c) by section 2 from doing anything, if he does that thing in order to
faciliatate the completion or carrying out of the transaction.
Id.
62 Id. A "jobber" is "an individual, partnership or company dealing in securities
on a recognized stock exchange and recognized by the Council of the Stock Exchange
as carrying on the business of a jobber." Id. at § 3(l)(c)(ii).
61 Id. at § 8.
64 See supra notes 16 and 20.
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Kingdom's statutory regulations, West Germany developed a vol-
untary set of anti-insider-trading guidelines.6 5 Adherence to this set
of guidelines is not mandatory, but once an individual or corporation
agrees to adhere to them, the parties involved monitor and enforce
compliance6 of the guidelines via a contract between them. 67 The
need for guidelines concerning insider trading in West Germany arose
because of the silence on the part of civil law and an inadequate
alternative cause of action at common law to remedy the problem. 68
The Commission of Stock Exchange Experts,6 9 recognizing a need
for some form of investor protection, undertook to draft a voluntary
set of guidelines for dealing with insider trading. These guidelines,
currently embodied in the Insider Trading Guidelines of July 1, 1976
("Guidelines"), 70 prohibit insider trading, but as previously stated
they are applicable only when a corporation agrees to follow them;
even then, the corporation may cease following them at any time. 71
The Guidelines are similar to the United Kingdom's 1985 Act in
that they initially establish a general prohibition of insider trading. 72
The definition of an "insider" under the Guidelines, however, is less
inclusive than under the United Kingdom's 1985 Act.73 Under the
Guidelines, insiders include the board of directors and legal repre-
sentatives of a corporation and its subsidiaries, domestic shareholders
holding more than 25% of a corporation's stock, or other employees
of a corporation in a position tending to receive inside information
and in some situations bank and credit institutions.74
63 Insider Rules (Insider-Regeln), published by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 1985
[hereinafter Insider Rules].
Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-
Restraint?, 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507, 519 (1986). Compliance is not monitored
by an independent entity but rather by the parties involved, although one of the
parties may ask the Board of Inquiry to investigate suspected violations. Id. at 520.
67 Insider Rules, supra note 65, at § 4 n.1; see also Blum, supra note 66, at 519.
" Blum, supra note 66, at 515.
69 In 1968, the Federal Minister of Economics established this commission to
draft and enact changes in the West German stock exchange system. Id.
70 Insider Rules, supra note 65. The guidelines amended an earlier document
adopted by the Commission of Stock Exchange Experts and the Minister of Economics
in 1970. This document was entitled "Recommendations for the Solution of the So-
Called Insider Problems." Blum, supra note 66, at 516.
7' Blum, supra note 66, at 519.
72 Insider Rules, supra note 65, at § 1.1; Blum, supra note 66, at 517; Elsing &
Gasser, Stock Exchange Rules in Germany and the Treatment of Insider Trading,
14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 191 (June 1986).
71 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
74 Not included in this definition are secondary insiders or tippees. Insider Rules,
supra note 65, at § 2.1(a)-(d); Blum, supra note 66, at 518; Elsing & Gasser, supra
note 72, at 191.
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Despite the somewhat limited definition of insiders, the Guidelines
define "inside information" rather broadly as "knowledge about
known and unknown circumstances which can influence the valuation
of insider securities." ' 7 The Guidelines then proceed to enumerate
examples of inside information.16 In determining what constitutes
inside information according to the Guidelines, the key is not the
confidentiality of the information, but rather the availability of the
information to the public at the time the insider trades upon that
information .77
Unlike the 1985 Act, the Guidelines impose no criminal sanction
for violations.78 Instead, the Guidelines impose a remedy via the law
of contracts. 79 When a corporation decides to abide by the Guidelines,
that corporation contracts with its "potential" insiders (usually through
an employment contract) to adhere to the Guidelines. If an insider
then breaks the contract with the corporation by trading on inside
information, the corporation may bring an action for breach of
contract. The corporation's remedy for breach amounts to the re-
covery of all profits made by the insider. In addition to this dis-
gorgement remedy, the courts may also enforce the contract, and the
insider must bear the cost of the proceedings if he has truly breached
the contract.8 0
C. The Directive Process
One of the main tools the EEC utilizes in its decision-making
process is the directive, and understanding the directive process proves
75 Insider Rules, supra note 65, at § 3 (as translated by Blum, supra note 66, at
518).
76 Insider Rules, supra note 65, at § 3(a)-(e) (as translated by Blum, supra note
66, at 518). The examples include:
(a) changes in dividend rates;
(b) substantial changes in earnings or facts which may influence such
earnings;
(c) actions taken to reduce or raise capital, including the raising of capital
from corporate resources;
(d) conclusion of a direct-control contract or profit-sharing agreement;
(e) takeover and settlement offers;
(f) planned mergers, amalgamations, transfers of assets, and reorganizations;
and
(g) dissolution of the company.
Id.
77 Blum, supra note 66, at 519; Elsing & Gasser, supra note 72, at 192.
71 This lack of criminality follows from the Guidelines' voluntary nature.
19 Blum, supra note 66, at 519.
80 Id. at 519-20.
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essential to analyzing the Draft Directive. The directive functions to
harmonize the laws of member-States in a particular area when the
EEC decides that complete legislative uniformity would be unnec-
essary.8 ' Once passed, a directive becomes binding only as to the
result to be achieved and not in the implementation of that result.12
This distinction provides member-States with flexibility in formulating
their domestic laws as long as they attain the required result.
The path of the directive begins in the EEC Commission, 3 where
the Commission organizes a working party to research a particular
issue and to make recommendations.8 The Commission then drafts
a text and adopts it as a proposal to the Council.85 Once the Council 6
receives the Commission's proposal, it then sends it to the European
Parliament87 and to the Economic and Social Committee,88 where
appropriate.8 9 After receiving the opinions of these two bodies (if
sent to both), the proposal goes to the Committee of Permanent
Representatives,9" where another working party organizes and prepares
" INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 23.
82 Id.; Note, supra note 19, at 164.
13 The Commission is composed of fourteen members appointed by the member-
States. Appointment is based primarily on individual expertise and independence.
Those individuals appointed serve four year terms. The functions of the Commission
include initiating legislation, monitoring compliance with the treaties, and various
executive functions. INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 11.
84 Id. at Dir. 20-22; Note, supra note 19, at 164.
" INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 20-22; Note, supra note 19, at 164-65.
16 The Council is the representative body of the member-States. Each state appoints
a minister or junior minister as representative. This is the EEC's "legislative" body,
adopting what may be labelled "Community legislation." The Council is also re-
sponsible for the EEC's treaties. INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 15-16.
87 The European Parliament is composed of representatives of the people of the
member-States. This body differs from the Council in that the Council represents
the national governments or parliaments and not necessarily the people. Members
of the European Parliament are directly elected by the people. Its function is mainly
to give advisory opinions on proposed legislation to the Council. While the Council
is not required to follow the European Parliament's opinion, it usually does. INT'L
ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 16-19.
88 The Economic and Social Committee is an advisory committee established by
the treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 79-81.
89 Only where proposed legislation deals with economic or social concerns of the
EEC, as defined in sections 193-98 of the Treaty, does the legislation go to the
Economic and Social Committee. Id.
90 The Committee of Permanent Representatives prepares the Council's work and
performs certain tasks delegated to it by the Council. INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at
Dir. 10.
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the Council's decision. 9' If the Committee reaches a consensus, the
Council generally adopts the proposal with little debate.92 If, however,
the Committee reaches no consensus, the Council's consideration of
the proposal involves prolonged debate and frequent concessions
because of the political nature of the problems which arise. 93 Even-
tually, the Council reaches a decision, and more often than not it
adopts the proposal as a Council Directive. 94
D. History of the Draft Insider Trading Directive
While concern over insider trading is not new in the EEC, the
Draft Insider Trading Directive represents the most authoritative step
yet taken. Work on the Draft Directive dates back to the early 1980's,
when the Commission organized a working party. 95 The working party
researched the subject area and conferred with the member-States,
members of the securities industry, and other interested professional
institutions. 96 The primary reason for organizing the working party
to research insider trading rests in one of the four freedoms to be
achieved by the EEC as stated in the Treaty of Rome:97 the freedom
91 Id. at Dir. 22; Note, supra note 19, at 165.
92 See INT'L ORG., supra note 5, at Dir. 22.
91 Id. The Directory section of volume II.A. of International Organization and
Integration explains these events as follows:
4. The final stage is that in which the Council deals with the proposal.
When full agreement has been reached at the level of the Committee of
P.R. [Permanent Representatives] between the Governments and the Com-
mission, the draft-decision is placed on the Council's agenda as a so-called
A-item, i.e. an item which requires no further discussion in the Council.
The latter then confines itself to adopting the decision without debate,
unless objections are raised at the meeting. Proposals on which no consensus
has been reached but which are considered to be ripe for submission to
the Council are termed B-items. Agreement on such points has to be reached
at the political level. Debates in the Council are frequently protracted and
exhausting ("marathon sessions"), particularly if they are encumbered by
the combination of disparate subjects to enable member states to make
concessions on certain issues in exchange for compensation in other fields
("package-deals").
Id. at Dir. 22.
94 Note, supra note 19, at 165.
91 Cruikshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346 (1982).
96 Id.
91 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
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of movement of capital. 9 The establishment of this freedom implies
the establishment of a common capital market, and the Commission
believes that the interpenetration of national capital markets is the
best way to establish a common capital market within the Com-
munity.9 9 If some national markets are less efficient than others with
regard to investor protection, then the process of interpenetration is
hindered. The EEC, therefore, attempted to equalize investor pro-
tection by drafting a directive on the subject.' °° After receiving the
working party's recommendations and debating the issue, the Com-
mission adopted the Draft Insider Trading Directive on April 28,
1987, and submitted it to the Council on May 25, 1987.101
E. Analysis of the Draft Insider Trading Directive
The text of the Draft Insider Trading Directive establishes a general
prohibition of insider trading which will require West Germany to
make its insider trading regulations mandatory'0 2 if the Draft Directive
is enacted. Before setting out the prohibitive provisions of the Draft
Directive, however, the Commission first addresses its justification
for battling insider trading in the preamble. 03 The preamble initially
recognizes that insider trading undermines investor confidence in the
secondary market in transferable securities. l°4 The Commission further
states that because investor confidence is essential for an efficiently-
operating secondary market, and since an efficiently-operating sec-
ondary market is vital to the financing of undertakings within the
Community, the EEC must necessarily combat insider trading.°5 After
98 Article 3(c) of the Treaty outlines the goal of obtaining the freedom of movement
of capital. This article states that "the activities of the Community shall include,
* . . (c) the abolition, as between member-States, of obstacles to freedom of movement
for persons, service and capital. . . ." Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987).
100 Id.
"I Draft Directive, supra note 6, at preamble.
102 The Draft Directive employs mandatory language ("Member-States shall . .
when it addresses the responsibilities of member-States in acting to protect against
insider trading. See Draft Directive, supra note 6 at arts. 1, 2, 3. To comply with
the Draft Directive, West Germany must, therefore, make insider trading regulation
mandatory.
,03 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at preamble.
104 "Insider trading, by benefiting certain investors at the expense of others, is
likely to undermine [the confidence of investors] and may therefore prejudice the
smooth operation of the secondary market in transferable securities." Id.
105 Id.
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formulating this argument on behalf of the regulation of insider
trading, the Draft Directive proceeds to describe the prohibition on
insider trading. A proper examination of this prohibition necessitates
breaking the prohibition down into three problem areas initially iden-
tified by the working party of the Commission: the definition of an
"insider," the definition of "inside information," and the restrictions
placed on insiders. I0
The Draft Directive's definition of an "insider" is a broad, all-
encompassing one, covering both primary and secondary inside trad-
ers. °7 Referring to primary inside traders, Article 1 of the Draft
Directive defines an insider as "any person who, in the exercise of
his profession or duties, acquires inside information .. ."108 Article
3 further extends this definition to include tippees who have "know-
ingly obtained inside information" from an insider as defined in
Article 1 above. °9 While the definition in Article 1 is broad in scope,
it is also commendably specific in setting appropriate parameters for
judicial application of the definition. Clearly, words like, "in the
exercise of," "profession" and "duties" must undergo judicial in-
terpretation,110 but overall, the definition does not appear to be
106 Cruikshank, supra note 95, at 346.
I'l Draft Directive, supra note 6. The Draft Directive addresses primary insiders
in Article 1 stating "any person who, in the exercise of his profession or duites,
acquires inside information as defined in Article 6." Id. at art. 1. In Article 3 the
Draft Directive goes on to define a secondary insider as "any person who has
knowingly obtained inside information from a person who has acquired that infor-
mation in the exercise of his profession or duties." Id. at art. 3.
108 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1 (emphasis added). Article 1, paragraph
1 states:
Member-States shall prohibit any person who, in the exercise of his pro-
fession or duties, acquires insider information as defined in Article 6 from
taking advantage of that information to buy or sell on their territory, either
directly or through another person, transferable securities admitted to trad-
ing on their stock exchange markets.
Id.
lo9 Id. at art. 3. Article 3, paragraph 1 states that "Member-States shall impose
the prohibition provided for in Article 1 in accordance with the terms referred to
therein also on any person who has knowingly obtained insider information from
a person who has acquired that information in the exercise of his profession or
duties." Id.
Io The ambiguity of these words combined with their interpretations by the separate
judicial bodies of the member-States may not provide the harmony sought by the
EEC. Because these words represent the paths by which one reaches the definition
of an insider, the various judicial bodies may interpret these words as broadly or
as narrowly as is consistent with their affinity to the idea of regulation of insider
trading. The possible disparity, however, is a necessary evil if insider trading is to
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plagued by any latent judicial doctrine, unlike its United States coun-
terpart.I1'
One example of the United States courts adding a judicial doctrine
to the notion of insider trading is found in the fact that while the
United States anti-insider trading statute makes no express mention
of a fiduciary element, the United States Supreme Court held that
for a person to fall within the purview of the term insider, he must
owe a fiduciary duty to the issuer, the issuer's shareholders, or another
relevant third party." 2 Within the EEC's definition of insider and its
corresponding prohibition, however, no apparent avenue arises by
which the definition of an insider might be limited by a fiduciary
element. Because the Draft Directive makes no mention of fraud,
which is the basis for the incorporation of a fiduciary element into
be regulated on a Community-wide level. If the Draft Directive attempted to define
these words, this action would merely create more words subject to judicial inter-
pretation. In the clarification of one word, another word is created which must be
interpreted. One mitigating aspect to this interpretive problem is that ultimately a
case involving the interpretation of these words will come before the European Court
of Justice and the court will render a single; Community-wide interpretation.
-" The United States counterpart to the Draft Directive is § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1987), issued thereunder. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1982), is limited to the disgorgement of profits realized in less than 6
months by officers, directors and beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class
of any equity security from trading in their corporation's stock. While section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, do not explicitly mention insiders or insider trading, courts interpret
these sections as prohibitions against insider trading. See, e.g., In Re Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
112 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella an employee of
a financial printing company traded based on information which he deduced from
confidential documents concerning upcoming takeover bids which were entrusted to
his employer for final printing. The United States Supreme Court held that the
individual employee did not fall within the definition of an insider because he owed
no fiduciary duty to the target company (whose stock he traded for a profit), nor
any duty to those persons with whom he traded in the open market. The Court left
open, however, the issue of whether an employee could be found to be an insider
based on his fiduciary obligation to his employer or to the employer's client (the
acquiring company). Id. at 235-36. This unresolved issue, labelled the "misappro-
priation" theory, has been decided in the affirmative by the Second Circuit. SEC
v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Recently, the United States Supreme
Court tackled the issue and upheld the Second Circuit's view based on a 4 to 4
decision which holds no precedential effect. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
316 (1987) (there were only 8 justices due to the vacancy left by the retirement of
Justice Powell).
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the United States definition,113 it appears unlikely that any fiduciary
element will attach, for the definition is self-contained.
Given the standards set forth in the Draft Directive, West Germany
must significantly enlarge its definition of an insider if the Council
adopts the directive. As already noted, West Germany narrowly de-
fines an insider by limiting its definition to specifically enumerated
primary inside traders. 411 To comply with the Draft Directive's def-
inition, West Germany must expand its definition to include any
primary and any secondary insider trader within the scope of the
directive. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, currently regulates
both types of insiders, 1 5 so any expansion of its definition with
respect to types of insiders is unnecessary. The only problem occuring
with the United Kingdom definition appears with regard to the "know-
ingly connected" requirement associated with primary insider trad-
ers.11 6 The Draft Directive contains no such restriction on defining
113 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (one of the major purposes
of the securities acts is the prevention of fraud, manipulation, or deceit); Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of]
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
Rule 1Ob-5 then states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (emphasis added). In Chiarella, the United States
Supreme Court held that § 10(b) is a "catch-all provision" for fraud only, and that
"[wihen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak;" the Court held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235. Because the United States statute mentioned
"fraud," the United States Supreme Court held that there must be a fiduciary
obligation. In the Draft Directive, however, there is no mention of fraud, and the
duty to disclose (or refrain from trading) arises from the statute itself.
114 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
1,I See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 52. Section 1(1) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act, 1985 defines a primary insider as "an individual who is or at any time in the
preceding 6 months has been, knowingly connected with a company. ... ." Company
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, § 1(1) (emphasis added). Technically,
because the Draft Directive does not also include the above 6 month limitation, the
United Kingdom's definition must change. The situation in which this difference
would be important, however, is too remote to merit attention.
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primary inside traders;"17 therefore, the United Kingdom will have to
remove this requirement from its definition of primary inside traders.
Similar to the definition of insider, the Draft Directive broadly
defines "inside information" as:
Information unknown to the public of a specific nature and relating
to one or more issuers of transferable securities, which, if it were
published, would be likely to have a material effect on the price of
the transferable security or transferable securities in question."18
This definition, like the definition of insider, contains words vul-
nerable to judicial interpretation (e.g. "unknown" and "material"),
but it provides a useful codification of the generally accepted meaning
of inside information."19 Four requisite elements for determining what
constitutes inside information emerge from this definition, each sub-
ject to judicial interpretation. To fall within this definition, the in-
formation must be: (1) unknown to the public; (2) relating to the
issuer or issuers; (3) likely to have a material effect if published; and
(4) of a specific nature.
Because of the breadth with which the Draft Directive defines
inside information, this definition coincides with both the United
Kingdom and West German definitions.' 2° Both definitions contain
the first three elements of the Draft Directive's definition: unkown
to the public, relating to the issuer or issuers, and likely to have a
material effect if published. The fourth element of the Draft Direc-
tive's definition of inside information, that it be of a specific nature,
however, is expressly mentioned only the United Kingdom's defini-
"I While the Draft Directive does not restrict its definition of primary inside
traders with a knowledge requirement, it does restrict secondary inside traders to
"any person who has knowingly obtained insider information... ." Draft Directive,
supra note 6, at art. 3 (emphasis added). The United Kingdom also restricts secondary
inside traders in the same manner. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985,
ch. 8, § 1(3)(a) (defining a secondary inside trader as "an individual [who] has
information which he knowingly obtained ... .") (emphasis added).
"8 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 6.
119 "Generally-accepted meaning" is not meant as a consensus of the current law
of all of the member-States, but rather the consensus of those member-States currently
regulating insider trading, for example the United Kingdom and West Germany.
120 See supra notes 58-60, 75-77 and accompanying text. Absent a statutory def-
inition of "inside information" in the United States, the courts have come to define
it as "material, nonpublic information." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
Another required characteristic of inside information in the United States is "that
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or similar relation of
trust and confidence between them." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
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tion.122 This final element is non-existent in the West German defi-
nition, but would require only a slight modification for West Germany
to comply with the Draft Directive. 22 With this modification as the
only necessary change in either definition, the Draft Directive defi-
nition of inside information does not substantively change the law
of either member-State in this area.
With the definitions of insider and inside information firmly in
place, the Draft Directive then proceeds to place its restrictions upon
any person or persons falling within those definitions. The Draft
Directive places three restrictions on both primary and secondary
insiders. The first restriction is the general prohibition against utilizing
inside information to buy or sell transferable securities directly or
through a broker. 23 This prohibition represents the typical insider
trading restriction and is common to both the United Kingdom
24
and West Germany 25 as well as the United States. 26 One interesting
limitation in the Draft Directive, however, is an express exclusion
from this restriction for any transaction which takes place outside
the stock exchange market and does not involve a "professional
intermediary.' 1 27 At first glance, this exception appears contrary to
the Draft Directive's goal of combating insider trading; however,
when viewed in light of the EEC's overall goal of promoting effi-
ciently-operating markets and considering EEC politics in general,
the exception makes sense. First, transactions external to stock ex-
change markets pose little threat to the smooth operation of those
markets because they are not associated with the exchange markets
and because their volume represents a minimal number of transactions
121 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122 While the West German definition refers generally to "known and unknown
circumstances," it may be argued that this "specific nature" is nonetheless already
included in the definition of inside information. This argument follows from the
examples provided by the definition. Each example is of a specific nature. See supra
notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text.
123 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at arts. 1 (primary inside traders) and 3 (secondary
inside traders).
124 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
,25 See supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
2I Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 2.
This exception states that "[tihe prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall not
apply to transferable securities bought or sold outside a stock exchange market
without the involvement of a professional intermediary." Id. The United Kingdom
also has a similar provision in its 1985 Act. See supra notes 50 and 51 and accom-
panying text.
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when compared to the volume carried out on the exchange markets.
Second, and more important, the EEC is acting in an area where
not all of the member-States are in agreement. To pass the Draft
Directive it will be necessary for its proponents to compromise some-
where, and this exception may represent just such a compromise.
Whatever the reason for this exception, while it poses an attractive
way for insiders to circumvent this first restriction, it does not appear
to be so large of a loophole as to render the Draft Directive inef-
fective. 121
Two other restrictions contained in the Draft Directive are "tipper"
restrictions, which are akin to the "tippee" restriction on trading but
attack the problem from the opposite side. Instead of restricting the
tippee (the person trading based on inside information), these pro-
visions restrict the tipper, or the one supplying the inside information.
The Draft Directive restricts tippers from disclosing inside information
to another except in the ordinary course of business and further
restricts the use of inside information to recommend to another the
purchase or sale of transferable securities. 129 Both restrictions apply
equally to primary and secondary inside traders, and are analagous
to provisions contained in the United Kingdom's 1985 Act'30 and to
a lesser extent in West Germany's Guidelines.' 3 '
121 For the majority of publicly-held stocks, the benefits of trading on a recognized
stock exchange outweigh the benefits of trading privately. A recognized stock ex-
change counters the main benefit of trading privately-circumvention of the Draft
Directive-with benefits such as potentially high prices for the sale of stock (or
lower prices for purchases), access to more buyers/sellers, and less risk of insider
trading.
129 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at arts. 2 & 3. Article 2, referring to primary
insiders states:
Member-States shall prohibit any person who is resident on their territory
and who acquires inside information in the exercise of his profession or
duties from:
- disclosing that inside information to a third party unless such disclosure
is made in the normal course of exercising his profession or duties,
- using that information to recommend a third party to buy or sell trans-
ferable securities admitted to trading on their stock exchange markets.
Id. Article 3(2) directs member-States to prohibit secondary insiders from: (1) "dis-
closing the inside information to a third party;" and (2) "using that inside information
to recommend a third party to buy or sell transferable securities admitted to trading
on their sto~k exchange markets." Id.
130 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, §§ 1(7)-(8).
"I' Insider Rules, supra note 65, at § 1.1-.2; Elsing & Gasser, supra note 72, at
191. The authors state that insiders (which only includes tippers) are prohibited from
"carrying out" or "procuring the carrying out of a transaction" based on inside
information. Id.
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Because insider trading cases frequently cross national boundaries,
the Draft Directive also adopts provisions for information exchange
and professional secrecy.3 2 The regulating bodies of the member-
States are required to freely exchange information whenever neces-
sary,' thus ensuring cooperation between national authorities in
investigating cases crossing national boundaries.3 4 The professional
secrecy provision attempts to ensure that the employees of the reg-
ulating bodies do not misuse the information gained by virtue of
their position.'
Although the Draft Directive represents a well-drafted and positive
step toward creating a true common capital market, it does not go
as far as necessary to achieve harmonization. To function effectively
and attain its goal, the Draft Directive must first attempt to harmonize
the penalties for insider trading.3 6 As seen through a comparison of
the United Kingdom and West Germany, penalties for insider trading
can vary widely between members. The United Kingdom imposes
criminal sanctions while West Germany imposes only civil penalties
based in contract, with enforcement left to the desire of the private
132 Draft Directive, supra note 6, at arts. 8 & 9.
- Id. After mandating that member-States establish "competent authorities" for
ensuring that the Draft Directive is followed, Article 8 states in paragraph 3 that
"[tihe competent authorities in the member-States shall cooperate wherever necessary
for the purpose of carrying out their duties and shall exchange any information for
that purpose." Id at art. 8.
114 Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ala 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987).
135Draft Directive, supra note 6, at art. 9. Article 9 provides in full:
1. Member-States shall provide that all persons employed or formerly
employed by the competent authorities referred to in Article 8 shall be
bound by professional secrecy. Information covered by professional secrecy
may not be divulged to any person or authority except by virtue of provisions
laid down by law.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not, however, preclude exchanges of information
between the various member-States by the authorities referred to in Article
8 as provided for in this Directive. Information thus exchanged shall be
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy to which the persons
employed or formerly employed by the competent authorities receiving the
information are subject.
3. Without prejudice to cases falling under criminal law, the authorities
referred to in Article 8 which receive information may use it only for the
exercise of their duties and in connection with administrative or judicial
proceedings specifically relating to the exercise of those duties.
136 Id. Article 11 of the Draft Directive gives to the Member-States the power to
determine their own penalties for violations of the Draft Directive's provisions. Id.
at art. 11.
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party harmed; an insider will clearly prefer the punishment issued by
West Germany. As long as the severity of penalties varies significantly,
unified regulation of insider trading will remain a problem. Those
members less desirous of regulating insider trading need only enact
nominal penalties for violations, as opposed to sanctions actually
deterring violations. The benefits from insider trading will thus out-
weigh the burden of the punishment for the activity within that
member-State. At the same time, other members wishing to seriously
deter insider trading will impose much harsher penalties. Any dis-
proportionate penalties will act as a hindrance to complete interpen-
etration of capital markets. Unless penalties between member-States
under the Draft Directive are harmonized, the problem of insider
trading will only be aggravated as the stock exchange markets become
truly globalized.13
The United Kingdom's penalties for insider trading violations of
imprisonment or fine or both are the most logical sanctions to attach
to the Draft Directive and most member-States will probably adopt
similar penalties. The problem, however, is that one state will consider
violations less grievous than others, and hence, lesser penalties will
be enacted. One possible solution might be to establish, via the Draft
Directive, a minimum penalty (fine or imprisonment or both) for a
violation of the Draft Directive's provisions. This minimum penalty,
if set at the correct level, would effectively eliminate the cost-benefit
trade-off associated with insider trading transactions.
CONCLUSION
The goal of the Draft Insider Trading Directive is an important
one to the proper functioning of the EEC: to provide a Community-
wide minimum level of investor protection, thereby approaching a
true common capital market. By prohibiting insider trading through-
out the member-States, the Draft Directive accomplishes a substantial
step toward this goal. The Draft Directive's provisions will require
most member-States to enact legislation or supplement existing leg-
islation, like West Germany, and even force the heavily-regulated
3I As internationalization and interconnection of the world's stock exchange mar-
kets increase, the inefficiency of one section of that global market will pull down
the efficiency of the whole global market. The problem that will occur is the same
problem currently facing the EEC, but on a larger scale. By harmonizing penalties
within the EEC, it will be easier for the Japanese, United States, EEC and other
markets to operate smoothly in the future.
[Vol. 18:119
EEC DRAFT INSIDER TRADING DIRECTIVE
members to rethink or rephrase their legislation, as seen in the United
Kingdom example. These changes, however, benefit the Community
as a whole; they direct the EEC towards increased freedom of move-
ment of capital and a true common capital market.
Notwithstanding the progress the Draft Directive represents, it falls
short of attaining its goal. Because the Draft Directive makes no
provision for the harmonization of penalties but in fact delegates this
power to the member-States, the free flow of capital will still be
inhibited. With the power to enact penalties, member-States averse
to the regulation of insider trading can establish penalties too weak
to deter insider trading while still complying with the Draft Directive.
This practice will allow insider trading to continue in some member-
States, thus inhibiting the formation of a true common capital market.
Before the EEC can realistically set its sights on such a goal, it must
first achieve a more comprehensive level of harmonization with regard
to insider trading.
Douglas A. Nystrom
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